

REPORTATIO IV, DISTINCTION 49, QUESTIONS 8–9

The *Reportatio* is our only source for these questions, since we do not have a *Lectura* on Book IV and Scotus did not dictate these questions when he revised Book IV of the *Ordinatio* (see Vatican XIV:394). Unfortunately the state of the texts is such that I am not comfortable including any translation of these questions in the forthcoming volume.

Book IV of the *Reportatio* has come down to us in two versions, A and B. The Wadding edition presents A; the edition of John Mair (or Major) presents B. The scholarly consensus seems to be that B is reliable and A is not. Whether this consensus is well-founded, I don't really know. I have it on what I take to be the best possible authority that what Baliç says about the various texts of the *Reportatio* is, if correct on any given point, only fortuitously so. So if (as I suspect, without any real basis for the suspicion) the consensus derives entirely or even largely from Baliç's say-so, it can be safely ignored.

Of course I don't know that the consensus is baseless or mistaken. What I do know from having looked carefully at the two version of distinction 49, questions 8 and 9, is that the text of *Reportatio* IV A is much better than the text of *Reportatio* IV B. I don't mean "better" in any sophisticated text-critical sense (say, closer to the original—I clearly am not remotely in a position to make a judgment like that), but just that the reasoning is clearer, the writing is less elliptical, the arguments are set forth more fully, and so on. A is simply a more philosophically competent text than B.

So rather than publish a translation of IV A (and risk criticism, possibly unfounded, not that that ever stopped anyone, for using a "bad" text) or IV B (which is a bit of a mess), I have relegated this material to the website. I have provided the following:

- (1) A translation of the text of IV A from the Wadding edition, with marginal numbers according to the practice of the new editions. I have made (and noted) some conjectural emendations. (I note that Fr Wolter's transcription of nn. 15–40 and 56–57 from Codex A differs substantively from the Wadding text only in supporting my conjectural emendations.)
- (2) A working text of IV B based on the Mair edition and Merton College MS 63, again with marginal numbers according to the practice of the new editions.
- (3) A translation of the text of IV B.

Anyone who takes the time to compare the A and B versions of either the Latin texts or the English translations will, I think, agree that I was wise to leave this material out of the published volume.

Anyway, all the topics covered in those questions are covered in other selections that I *am* publishing.

Reportatio IV A, distinction 49, question 8, “Do all human beings will happiness supremely and necessarily?” and question 9, “Is everything that is desired, desired on account of happiness?”

QUESTION 8, “DO ALL HUMAN BEINGS WILL HAPPINESS SUPREMEY AND NECESSARILY?”

1 It seems that they do not.

First, “nothing is loved unless it is known,” according to Augustine, *De Trinitate* I.1. But not all human beings know happiness, as it evident from the variety of things people do in order to attain it, according to *Ethics* I.2. Therefore, etc.

2 Furthermore, the damned do not desire happiness. For if one despairs of attaining something, one does not desire it (or at least one desires it only weakly), according to Augustine, *De Trinitate* X.1; and the damned despair of attaining happiness. Therefore, they do not desire it.

3 Confirmation: what is presented or apprehended as impossible is not desired, for one desires¹ something only insofar as one apprehends it as possible for oneself. Now the damned apprehend happiness as something impossible for themselves. Therefore, they do not desire it.

4 Furthermore, it is not the case that all human beings desire it *necessarily*, for if they desired happiness necessarily, they would not² obtain merit in desiring it. The inference is evident, because no one obtains merit (or demerit) by doing what he cannot avoid doing, since sin and merit are voluntary. The consequent is evidently false, since someone obtains merit in desiring things that are for the end, and one desires things that are for the end through one’s desire for the end; now if x is for the sake of y , [and x is F ,] y is more F ; therefore, one obtains more merit by desiring and willing the end.

5 Furthermore, it is evidently not the case that all human beings desire it *supremely*. For an act that is supremely fitting for a given power is not compatible with another act of that power. For the more a power is spread out into a variety of acts, the less intensely it acts in any one of them. Now the desire for the end is compatible with another act, since otherwise a will that desired the end could not make use of something for the end.

6 On the contrary:

Augustine, *De Trinitate* XIII.8: “All will to be happy, as the truth cries out.” But what belongs to something contingently, sometimes belongs to it and sometimes does not. Therefore, [if human beings desired happiness only contingently,] the truth would not always cry out that all will to be happy.

¹ Conjecturing *appetit* for *apprehenditur*.

² Conjecturing *non*.

7 Furthermore, Augustine says in *De Trinitate* XVIII.5 that all desire the end with a most ardent love.

8 Furthermore, *Physics* II.89 and *Ethics* VII.12: "As a principle is in speculative matters, so is the end in matters of action." Now the intellect necessarily and supremely desires the ultimate end, which is happiness. The Philosopher says in *Ethics* I.1. that it desires happiness supremely: "The ancients rightly said that the good is what all things desire." Now just as one can infer unqualifiedly from unqualifiedly and more from more, one can infer maximal from maximal. Therefore, all maximally desire the maximal good, which is happiness.

9 Furthermore, according to Anselm, the will cannot not will the advantageous good. Therefore, etc.

And I ask a further question:

QUESTION 9, "IS EVERYTHING THAT IS DESIRED, DESIRED ON ACCOUNT OF HAPPINESS?"

10 It seems that it is:

Augustine, *De Trinitate* XIII.5: "All will to be happy, and on account of this everything else they desire," etc.

11 Furthermore, the principle in a given genus is the cause of [all] other things in that genus. So, in the genus of desirable things, since the first desirable thing is happiness, happiness will be the cause of desirability in other things. Therefore, all other things are desired on account of happiness.

12 Furthermore, if something other than happiness is desired, and *not* on account of happiness, then it is desired *as* happiness. So if something is not desired on account of happiness, it follows that it is desired as happiness. Therefore, whatever is desired is desired either on account of happiness or as happiness.

13 On the contrary:

Not everyone who desires knows happiness. Therefore, not everyone who desires desires on account of happiness. The inference is evident, since nothing is desired unless it is known.³

14 Furthermore, if everyone desired on account of happiness whatever he desired, then anyone who desired would have two acts of desiring in his will simultaneously. Proof of the inference: one cannot desire something on account of happiness unless one desires happiness; therefore, everyone who desires something would desire not only that thing but also happiness

³ Conjecturing *cognitum* for *contingenter* (!).

and would have two acts of desiring simultaneously.

I. REPLY TO QUESTION 8

15 In reply to the first question I say that there is a twofold appetite or will: natural and free. For the will can be considered as it is a certain nature, insofar as it has a natural inclination and appetite for its own perfection, just as any other nature has. So we must first examine the will's natural willing—its willing insofar as it is a certain nature—and second its free willing—its willing insofar as it desires freely.

A. THE WILL AS NATURE

16 Regarding the first topic, we must examine what a natural appetite is. I say that it is not an elicited act. For the natural appetite of the will is to the will what the natural appetite of the intellect is to the intellect, and the natural appetite in the intellect is not an elicited act, so neither is the natural appetite in the will.

17 Furthermore, natural appetite is always in the will, so if it were an elicited act of the will, some elicited act would always be in the will. But there is no elicited act that the will always has; if there were, we could experience it in ourselves—for it is absurd that there should be some activity that is always present in us but hidden from us. But this is absurd, as the Philosopher argues about habits.

18 Furthermore, if natural appetite were an elicited act in the will, there would be two opposed acts in the will simultaneously, since the will can freely will the opposite of what it desires by its natural appetite. For example, Paul, who spoke in terms of natural desire when he said in 2 Corinthians 5:4, “We do not will to be unclothed, but to be further clothed,” willed by his free appetite “to be dissolved and to be with Christ,” as he says in Philippians 1:23. Therefore, natural appetite is no more an elicited act in the will than natural appetite is an elicited act in a stone.

19 What is it, then? I say that it is an inclination to its own perfection, just as natural appetite is in other things that do not have a free appetite. In *Physics* I.81 the Philosopher says of this appetite that matter desires (*appetit*) form as the imperfect desires its own perfection. Now in terms of this natural (not free) appetite, it is clear that the will necessarily (or always) and supremely desires happiness, and indeed happiness in particular. That it desires happiness *necessarily* is evident, because a nature can't remain a nature without being inclined to its own perfection. Take away this inclination, then, and you take away the nature. And natural appetite *just is* such an inclination to a thing's own perfection. Similarly, the will as nature necessarily desires its own perfection, and its supreme perfection is happiness, and it does so by natural appetite.

20 Proof that it desires happiness *supremely*: a nature's supreme inclination is to its supreme perfection. So if a nature desires its own perfection, it supremely desires its supreme perfection. This is how the Philosopher argues in the prologue to *Metaphysics* I: If "all human beings naturally desire to know," they supremely desire supreme knowledge. So, since the supreme perfection of the will is happiness, it follows that the will as nature supremely desires happiness.

21 Furthermore, if the will as nature necessarily desires happiness, it follows that it supremely desires happiness. The inference is evident, since if it is not within a thing's power to tend [or not tend] toward x , it is not within its power to tend toward x [intensely or] not intensely. So if the will as nature is determined necessarily to desiring happiness, it follows that the will as nature supremely desires happiness.

22 It is evident that it desires happiness naturally *in particular* because that appetite is toward the perfection in which the will is really perfected, and a real perfection is not something universal, but singular. Therefore, it desires happiness in particular.

23 Furthermore, natural appetite is not an act that follows cognition, since if it were, it would not be natural, but free. And only an object of intellect, or something consequent upon an act of intellect, is universal. Therefore, this appetite in the will is aimed at happiness in particular.

B. THE WILL AS FREE

24 As for the second topic, free appetite: do all human beings necessarily and supremely desire happiness by their free appetite? There is one view that says yes, but universally, not in particular. They offer an argument like this for the first [part of their claim: that is, for the claim that all people necessarily and supremely desire happiness *universally*]. That in which there is no aspect of badness or deficiency of goodness is desired necessarily; happiness, taken universally, is like that; so it follows from this that happiness is desired supremely. For if it is not in something's power either to act or not to act, it is not in that thing's power to act either intensely or not intensely. They say that happiness in particular is not desired necessarily, because if it were, no one could sin.

25 I argued at length against this view in Book 1 in the question "Does the will necessarily enjoy the end when it is apprehended by the intellect?"⁴ As far as the present issue is concerned, it seems to me that the claim that everyone necessarily desires happiness apprehended universally but not in particular implies a contradiction. For if happiness apprehended universally is desired necessarily because it has every aspect of goodness and no aspect of badness or deficiency of goodness, then, given that happiness apprehended in particular has

⁴ *Ordinatio* I d. 1 pars 2 q. 2.

every aspect of goodness, no aspect of badness, and no deficiency of goodness more fully than happiness apprehended universally, it follows that everyone necessarily desires the end, happiness, apprehended in particular.

26 Furthermore, a universal does not include greater perfection than a particular. Indeed, a particular evidently adds more perfection over and above the universal. Therefore, happiness taken universally does not bespeak greater perfection than happiness taken in particular. So if it is impossible not to desire happiness apprehended universally, because there is no aspect of evil in it, it is even less possible for the end [apprehended] in particular not to be desired.

27 Furthermore, if the will necessarily desired happiness taken universally, this necessity in willing would have to be ascribed to it in virtue of the will's natural inclination to happiness. But a natural inclination is to some particular, not to a universal, as became evident earlier. Therefore, a much greater necessity of desiring the ultimate end in particular would have to be ascribed to the will.

28 Furthermore, how are the following all compatible with each other: (1) the will necessarily desires happiness apprehended universally, (2) the intellect does not doubt, but dictates that happiness is found only in this particular, and (3) nonetheless, the will does not necessarily will that end in particular? This is the same as saying that will desires one and the same thing both necessarily and not necessarily.

29 So on this point I reply that although a wayfarer's will does indeed for the most part will happiness apprehended universally, as well as happiness in particular when the intellect does not doubt⁵ that happiness is found in this particular, nonetheless it does not will happiness necessarily, either universally or in particular. The reason for this is that necessity in a superior cause cannot derive from necessity in an inferior cause, because an inferior cause cannot determine the mode of acting of a superior cause, just as it cannot determine a superior cause to act. So if a superior cause acts necessarily, it has this necessity from its own intrinsic being and from its own nature. So if the will necessarily wills something, this necessity characterizes the will in virtue of its own nature (*ratio*) and not in virtue of some inferior cause.

30 Then I argue further: if a superior cause acts necessarily, with that same necessity it moves to acting those inferior causes whose actions are necessarily required for its own action. So given that apprehension in the intellect is required for the will's action in willing, it follows that if the will necessarily willed happiness, it would necessarily determine the intellect always to think about happiness, which is false.

31 I therefore say that the will contingently wills the end and happiness, both universally and in particular, although it does for the most part will not only happiness universally but also happiness in particular, when the intellect does not doubt that happiness consists in this particular. Hence, if someone desires happiness and at that same time believes that happiness

⁵ Reading *non dubitat* (as we see two paragraphs down) for the edition's *non dictat* (!).

consists in enjoying the divine essence as it is in the Three Persons, then at that time he wills that end in particular by his free appetite, but he does not by that same appetite will the means by which that end is attained, since he does not will to live virtuously.

32 Now the reason that the will for the most part wills happiness is that the will for the most part follows the inclination of the natural appetite. For it is impossible for the will to be habituated or inclined more strongly to willing anything than it is by the inclination of the natural appetite.⁶ For given that the will can be so much habituated by a habit that it for the most part follows the inclination of that habit and indeed acts with pleasure in following that inclination, all the more so does the will will for the most part that to which its natural appetite inclines it. For that reason a just person, even with that habit [of justice] or any other habit, chooses death with difficulty, and such a choice is for him a matter of suffering (*materia patientiae*), because it is contrary to his natural inclination.

33 So since everyone desires happiness by natural appetite, as I said above, it follows that the will for the most part desires or wills happiness.

34 But is this act of the will by which it wills happiness *natural*? I say that it is not properly natural, since it is not the natural inclination to happiness, which is called the natural willing of the will as nature. It can, however, be called a natural act in the sense that it is in conformity with natural inclination. This is why Augustine says in *Enchiridion* 28.105, “The will by which we so will to be happy that we do not merely will-against unhappiness but cannot in any way will to be unhappy is not blameworthy, nor it is not a will, nor should it be said not to be free.” Hence, just as some willing is not called virtuous because a virtue⁷ elicits the act—in my view, no habit is the total principle that elicits an act—but rather it is called a virtuous act because it is in conformity with the inclination of virtue and is elicited in accordance with the inclination of virtue, so too, in the case at hand,⁸ that of the volition of happiness, it can be called natural because it is in conformity with the will’s natural inclination. That does not mean that it is a purely natural act; rather, it is free. Still, it is not a willing informed by deliberation. For a volition informed by deliberation concerns the things with which choice has to do, namely, things that are for the end, and that which appears as the conclusion of a practical syllogism.

35 But here it is unclear whether if, as Augustine says in the cited passage, we cannot will unhappiness, it follows that likewise we cannot not will-against unhappiness. Now this does follow: if I necessarily will-against unhappiness, I necessarily will happiness. The inference is evident in two ways. First, happiness is no less apt to be willed than evil or (in other words)

⁶ Conjecturing *impossibile enim est quod voluntas per aliquem habitum habilitetur vel inclinetur magis quam per inclinationem appetitus naturalis* for the edition’s *impossibile . . . inclinetur ad volendum aliquid nisi per inclinationem . . .*

⁷ Conjecturing *virtus* for the edition’s *intellectus* (!).

⁸ Conjecturing *in proposito* for the edition’s *in opposito* (!).

unhappiness is apt to be willed-against. Second, an act of willing-against is present only in virtue of some volition; for I will-against one thing because I will some other thing. Now a cause is more perfect than its effect. Therefore, I will happiness with a greater necessity than I will-against unhappiness.

36 I reply that I do not necessarily will happiness and I do not necessarily will-against unhappiness. Hence, this does not follow: I do not will to be unhappy; therefore, I will-against unhappiness or will-against being unhappy. Nor does this follow: I cannot will to be unhappy; therefore, I necessarily will-against being unhappy. For willing-against is a positive act of will, just as willing is, and thus willing-against is free just as willing is. Therefore, the will does not necessarily elicit either concerning any object, and accordingly I can not elicit willing-against concerning what is bad, just as I can not elicit willing concerning what is good. Nonetheless, concerning what is presented as bad I cannot elicit an act of the will other than willing-against, and concerning what is presented as good I cannot elicit an act of the will other than willing. Accordingly, here is the right way to argue: I cannot will to be unhappy; therefore, I cannot hate happiness. But this does not follow: therefore, I necessarily will happiness. For as I showed above, no willing is necessarily elicited by the will.

37 But someone will continue to object: the only reason that a power necessarily lacks some act is that it is determined to the opposite act. For example, fire necessarily lacks coldness because it is determined to heat, and a given surface lacks one color because it is determined to the opposite color. Therefore, the only reason it is impossible for the will to will-against happiness is that it is necessarily determined to the opposite act, that is, to willing happiness.

38 I reply that the act of willing unhappiness and the act of willing-against happiness are excluded from the will because unhappiness is not suited to be an object of willing and happiness is not suited to be an object of willing-against, in just the same way that an act of seeing blackness in virtue of a dilation in the medium is excluded from vision because blackness is not suited to be an object of such an act. So it is in the case at hand, and that is why the will is not capable of such an act concerning such an object. I therefore say that the will is determined to will happiness and to will-against unhappiness in the following way: if the will elicits any act at all concerning these objects, it necessarily and determinately elicits an act of willing-against concerning unhappiness and an act of willing concerning happiness. But it is not determined absolutely to eliciting either the one act or the other.

39 As for the argument given for the other view—that that in which there is no aspect of badness or deficiency of goodness is necessarily willed by the will—I say that this is false, because the will is free with respect to every act of willing or willing-against, and it is not necessitated by any object, and yet the will cannot will-against or hate happiness or will unhappiness. Hence, this would be the right way to argue: the will cannot recoil from that object in which there is no aspect of badness or deficiency of goodness; therefore, it cannot hate or detest happiness. And that's true. But it doesn't follow from this that it necessarily wills

happiness.

40 Now you might ask: if the will neither necessarily wills happiness nor necessarily hates or detests happiness, what sort of act does the will have concerning happiness when it is presented by the intellect? I say that, for the most part, it has an act of willing, but it does not necessarily have any act at all. Hence, when happiness is presented to the will, it can refrain from acting altogether. Otherwise, it would turn out that when the ignorant apprehend something that pertains to the ultimate end, but they don't know whether it is of the essence of the ultimate end, they would be bound to will it. Hence, the will can not will, and can not will-against, any object, and in any particular act it can refrain from both willing and willing-against. And we can all experience this in ourselves when someone offers us something good. Even if the thing is presented to us [by our intellect] as good, as something to be thought of and willed as good, we can turn away from it and elicit no act of will concerning it.

II. REPLIES TO THE PRELIMINARY ARGUMENTS

41 To the first preliminary argument, which argues that not everyone knows happiness and therefore not everyone desires it, I say that this conclusion applies to an elicited act of will. For not everyone desires happiness by an elicited act of will when they are not thinking about happiness. But the natural appetite is not an elicited act.

42 As for the second argument, which argues that the damned do not desire happiness, there are evidently two doubtful points about this. The first concerns their natural appetite: for if they naturally desire happiness, that appetite in them is evidently in vain, since it is a desire for something impossible. The other doubtful point is whether they desire happiness by an elicited act when they apprehend it. After all, they can have an act of will concerning anything that they apprehend, and they can't have an act of willing-against concerning happiness, so it must be an act of willing. But then it is unclear how they can will happiness when they know that happiness is impossible for them.

43 As for the first, I say that there is in the damned a natural appetite for happiness, since, as I said above, natural appetite does not add anything absolute over and above the nature, but only the inclination to the nature's perfection; accordingly, if the nature remains intact, so does the natural appetite.

44 Now you might say that in that case, the appetite is in vain. Well I say to you that the damned are human beings or angels in vain, since natural appetite does not add anything absolute over and above the nature. Hence, I say that although that something is in vain that lacks its whole perfection and is frustrated according to its whole species, it is not in vain if it lacks that perfection in a given individual, as the case of monsters illustrates. But that is not the case here, because some [human beings and angels] are happy and are perfected in terms of their natural appetite. By contrast, those who claim that all angels differ in species have to

acknowledge that many natural appetites are in vain, since it is impossible for those appetites to attain perfection in their entire species.

45 But as for elicited willing, I say that if they have cognition of happiness and are thinking about it, they can have a volition that follows natural appetite and is in conformity with it, and so they can desire happiness by an elicited willing, just as evil wayfarers can, though in virtue of an immoderate affection for advantage, since it is not moderated by the affection for justice, inasmuch as they desire happiness as advantageous for themselves.

46 So I concede that the damned desire happiness. For I do not believe that any habit can be given to them that would incline their will more to not desiring happiness or to detesting it than their natural inclination inclines them to willing. And so there is no habit of obstinacy in them so that they are inclined with greater pleasure to the opposite of happiness rather than willing happiness by an elicited act in accordance with their natural appetite; this elicited act is in conformity with their natural inclination.

46 So to the argument that happiness is presented to the damned as impossible for them and under the aspect of the impossible, and where there is no hope of attaining something, either (as Augustine says) it is not desired at all or it is desired only weakly, I say that there are two sorts of volition. One is efficacious volition, which is volition of an end through means ordered toward attaining that end. The other is simple volition, or (in other words) conditional volition, which is volition of an end without carrying out any means to attain that end; the end is simply desired, and one would will to tend toward it if one could and if the object were present. There is no efficacious volition of anything that is apprehended as impossible, but only of something apprehended as possible. For example, if health is presented to someone as impossible to attain, he does not desire it with an efficacious volition, taking steps by which health can be achieved.

47 But there can be simple volition—indeed, a maximally intense volition—of something impossible. And there can be merit and demerit in such a volition: for example, if someone desires to fornicate when it is impossible for him to have the opportunity to fornicate. It is in this way that the damned will happiness, and the advantageous good, above all else, and perhaps more intensely than we do as wayfarers, even though they apprehend it as impossible for them; and they would have the very greatest pleasure in thinking about that object if they were permitted to do so.

48 Perhaps their greatest punishment consists precisely in the fact that fire prevents them from such thought, since they are not permitted to think about God as the object of natural happiness, and they would have the very greatest pleasure in thinking about that object and about the act by which they would tend toward it.

49 To the next argument, which says that happiness is not desired necessarily, because no one would obtain merit by desiring the end, some writers draw the conclusion that there is no merit in the volition of the end taken universally, but only in particular, because one can err or

not err in regard to the end in particular but not in regard to the end taken universally. If this were true, then a necessary condition for an act's being meritorious is that the act characterizes the will only contingently, given the apprehension of the object. This is evidently a difficulty for their view. Or if this is not a necessary condition, then it can be said that an act [of willing the end taken universally] is meritorious because it is morally good and accepted by God. Now an act of the will that concerns the ultimate end is maximally good; indeed, it is good by the very fact that it concerns such an end for its own sake. Given that, one can preserve the claim that an act of the will concerning the ultimate end is meritorious. Hence, whether the will necessarily wills the end when the ultimate end is apprehended, or does not necessarily will the end, it does not take away merit.

50 An alternative response is that although the will necessarily wills the ultimate end as an advantageous good, it does not necessarily will the end as an object of intrinsic value in its own right (*obiectum honestum*). The act of a will that tends toward the ultimate end in the second way is meritorious, but the act of a will that tends toward it in the first way is not.

51 To the next argument, which concludes that happiness is not willed supremely, the response is evident: happiness is desired supremely by the natural appetite but not always by the elicited appetite, because it is not desired necessarily by the elicited appetite; and thus it is compatible with another act.

52 As for the first argument for the affirmative, which quotes Augustine in support of the claim that we all will to be happy, that is true of the natural appetite; it is also true, for the most part, of the free appetite.

53 As for the next argument, which says that all desire happiness with a most ardent love, that is true of the natural appetite; it is also true, for the most part, of the free appetite.

54 As for the next argument, which says that an end is in matters of action what a principle is in speculative matters, what should be said is just what I said in Book I⁹: the analogy is on the part of the *objects*. For an end is to things that are for the end as a principle is to the conclusions that can be deduced from the principle. The analogy does not hold of the respective powers: in other words, just because the one power is drawn necessarily to one object, it does not follow that the other power is drawn necessarily to its object.

55 To the next argument, which cites Anselm's claim that the will cannot not will in accordance with the affection for advantage,¹⁰ I say that Anselm was offering a thought-experiment involving one angel created with only the affection for advantage. And it is true that such an angel cannot not will in accordance with the affection for advantage.¹¹ Hence, if the affection for advantage were without freedom and without the affection for justice, such an

⁹ *Ordinatio* I d. 1 pars 2 q. 2?

¹⁰ Conjecturing *secundum affectionem commodi* for *affectionem commodi*.

¹¹ Ditto. Better, really, to read *commodum* for *affectionem commodi*, but who knows?

appetite could not fail to desire advantageous things once they were apprehended, in just the same way that the sensory appetite cannot fail to desire an advantageous good once it is apprehended. But where both affections are present, it need not be the case that one necessarily desires in accordance with the affection for advantage; rather, the free will can not desire what the affection for advantage desires and can moderate that affection through the affection for justice.

III. REPLY TO QUESTION 9

56 To the second question I reply that, speaking in terms of the natural appetite, whatever the will desires, it desires for the sake of happiness, since in accordance with its natural appetite it desires a given thing insofar as it is a perfection for itself. Now any perfection of the natural appetite is a perfection of that appetite as directed toward its ultimate perfection. And so, given that whatever the will desires in accordance with its natural appetite, it desires as directed toward its own good, and this is its happiness, it follows that whatever the will desires in accordance with its natural appetite, it desires for the sake of happiness.

57 But if the question is asking about the will's appetite insofar as it is an elicited act, then I say that it need not be the case that the will desires whatever it desires for the sake of the ultimate end and for the sake of happiness. This is the case both negatively and contrarily: *negatively*, because it can desire something and not think about the ultimate end of happiness, and consequently in such a case it does not desire the thing for the sake of happiness because it is not aware of happiness at that time. Similarly, one can desire something without directing it toward happiness, and so in that case too one does not desire it for the sake of happiness. One can also desire something and not desire it for the sake of happiness *contrarily*, because one can desire something that is contrary to happiness or is not directed toward happiness. For a believer can conceive of happiness in particular, as the enjoyment of the one divine essence in the Three Persons, and can conceive of something that is in no way directed toward that happiness—say, fornication. So, with that apprehension of fornication, which can in no way be directed toward happiness, remaining present, he can desire fornication. But in thus desiring fornication, he is not desiring it as directed toward happiness. So the will can desire something not for the sake of happiness.

58 As for the first argument, which cites Augustine for the claim that whatever we desire, we desire for the sake of happiness, that is true of the natural appetite; it is also true, for the most part, of an elicited act of the free appetite.

59 As for the second argument, which says that what is first in each genus is the cause of all the other items in that genus, I concede that that is true, and that the good desirable in itself, which is the ultimate end, is the cause of the will of other things. But it doesn't follow that it is a *necessary* cause of other things insofar as they can be willed by a power of volition.

60 To the third argument, which says that if something is desired and is not desired for the sake of the ultimate end, it is desired for its own sake, I say that such a thing is desired for its own sake *negatively*—that is, not in relation to anything else—but not for its own sake in the sense that it is regarded as the universal end. Thus it is not desired for its own sake *contrarily*: one neither enjoys it nor desires it as directed to something else, and thus one neither uses it nor enjoys it. There are many acts like this in our wills, acts that are neither use nor enjoyment. For if we were required in every act of our will either to use or to enjoy, many of our acts would be sins: any act when we are not thinking of the ultimate end when we do something through our will.

61 To the first argument for the negative, I reply that the conclusion is true of a free act, which is an elicited act. For we do not always desire the ultimate end by an elicited act, since we do not always think of the ultimate end.

62 To the second argument, which says that someone who desires something would have two acts of desiring simultaneously if he desired it for the sake of the end, I say that someone can desire something for the sake of the end in a single act,¹² just as the intellect reasons discursively from a principle to a conclusion in a single act of understanding. For a discursive act is a single act of understanding, and there is nothing untenable about there being more than one object for a single act when those objects have a unity of order.

63 But there is a debatable point: does the one act in which the will desires something for the sake of the end coexist with the two proper acts, one of which concerns the end and the other of which concerns what is for the end? There is an analogous question concerning the discursive act of the intellect: does that act of the intellect coexist with the proper knowledge of a principle and a distinct proper knowledge of the conclusion? But if one were to say that those prior, proper acts coexist with the comparative act, then a plurality of acts could exist simultaneously in one and the same power without interfering with each other; rather, they are required for the intellect's discursive, comparative act or for the will's act of willing one thing for the sake of another. Analogously, if the power of sight saw black and white and, by seeing, judged them to be different from each other along with that [initial] act [of seeing black and white], that quasi-comparative act would coexist with the proper acts of seeing-white and seeing-black.

¹² Conjecturing *uno actu* (as in the next clause) for *uno modo*.

Reportatio IV B, distinction 49, questions 8 and 9

Transcribed from the John Mair (Major) edition (Paris, 1517) and Merton College MS 63, fols 98v–100r

[QUAESTIO 8

UTRUM OMNES HOMINES DE NECESSITATE ET SUMME VELINT BEATITUDINEM]

1 Octavo quaeritur utrum omnes homines de necessitate et summe velint beatitudinem.

2 Quod non:

Ignotum non potest appeti, secundum Augustinum, X *De Trinitate* 1. Sed non omnes homines cognoscunt beatitudinem, ut patet I *Ethicorum*.

3 Item, damnati non appetunt beatitudinem, tum quia desperant, et secundum Augustinum, de quo non est spes vel non appetitur vel, si appetatur, hoc est remisse, tum quia beatitudo ostenditur eis tamquam bonum impossibile eis.

4 Item, si de necessitate omnes homines appeterent beatitudinem, ergo non meremur in appetendo, quia nec est meritorium nec demeritorium quod non potest vitari. Falsitas consequentis patet, quia in volendo ea quae sunt ad finem meremur, igitur in volendo finem, quia non meremur volendo ea quae sunt ad finem nisi quatenus sunt ad finem. Nunc autem propter quod, illud magis; ergo volendo finem magis meremur.

5 Item, quod non summe appetant beatitudinem: quia actus in summo non compatitur secum actum alterius potentiae, nec alium eiusdem. Sed cum volitione qua volumus beatitudinem stat uti. Igitur iste actus non est in summo.

6 Oppositum:

Augustinus XIII *De Trinitate* 8, beati omnes esse volunt, ut omnes clamant. Igitur de necessitate. Quod summe velint, in eodem, XIII.5, ardentissimo amore, etc.

7 Item, II *Physicorum* and VII *Ethicorum*, sic se habet principium in speculabilibus sicut finis in operabilibus.

8 Item, Anselmus, *De concordia* XX, non velle nequit, etc. Et I *Ethicorum* vult Philosophus quod bene dicunt dicentes felicitatem esse quod omnia appetunt. Igitur de necessitate et summe appetitur.

[QUAESTIO 9

UTRUM PROPTER BEATITUDINEM APPETITUR QUICQUID APPETITUR]

9 Nono quaeritur utrum propter beatitudinem appetitur quicquid appetitur.

- 10 Quod sic:
Augustinus, XIII *De Trinitate* 5, propter hanc omnia appetunt, etc.
- 11 Item, primum in omni genere est causa omnium aliorum. Beatitudo est primum in genere appetibilium.
- 12 Item, si aliquid appetatur et non propter beatitudinem, igitur appetitur propter se, et per consequens appetitur ut beatitudo. Igitur si aliud a beatitudine non appetitur propter beatitudinem, appetitur propter beatitudinem.
- 13 Oppositum:
Non quilibet intelligit beatitudinem. Igitur non quilibet appetit quod appetit propter beatitudinem.
- 14 Item, si sic, igitur simul essent duo actus in voluntate. Quia si appetitur aliquid propter beatitudinem, igitur tunc appetitur beatitudo, et sic unus actus est in voluntate, et appetitur illud aliud, et sic alius actus est in voluntate.

[I. AD OCTAVAM QUAESTIONEM
A. DE APPETITU NATURALI ET APPETITU LIBERO]

- 15 Ad primam quaestionem dico quod appetitus in parte intellectiva duplex est: appetitus naturalis et appetitus liber. Quia omnis natura habet uno modo appetitum naturalem, voluntas igitur habet naturalem inclinationem et velle liberum. Primus appetitus voluntatis non est actus elicitus a voluntate, quia sicut apprehensio ipsius intellectus naturalis non est actus elicitus ab intellectu, sic nec voluntatis, quia si sic, cum ille maneat semper manente natura, igitur aliquis actus secundus esset sempiternus in voluntate, et tunc forent aliquando simul in voluntate appetitus oppositi, sicut Paulus appetitu naturali noluit expoliari et appetitu elicitato voluit esse cum Christo. Unde inclinatio naturalis ad propriam perfectionem nunquam est actus elicitus nec differt re absoluta a natura. Et sic I *Physicorum* habetur quod materia appetit formam et universaliter imperfectum suam perfectionem.
- 16 Loquendo de isto appetitu voluntatis dico quod de necessitate et summe et perpetuo vult beatitudinem, quia non potest natura esse perfecta sine beatitudine, et non solum vult eam in universali sed summe in particulari, quia si naturaliter vult perfectionem, igitur summe vult summam perfectionem. Talis est beatitudo in se et in particulari. Quia in cuius potestate non est agere vel non agere, sed necessario agere, in eius potestate non est remisse agere. Ideo agens naturale semper agit secundum ultimum potentiae. Et quod necessario velit eam in particulari patet, quia ad perfectionem voluntatis non sufficit beatitudo in universali, sed beatitudo realis et intrinseca per quam coniungitur ad ultimum finem immediate, et hoc est beatitudine reali singulari. Unde quod sic appetatur non requiritur quod sit cognitum neque quod actus sit elicitus appetendi.

17 Si quaeratur de appetitu libero, dicitur quod adhuc voluntas de necessitate vult beatitudinem, saltem in universali, licet posset non velle summe in particulari, quia voluntas non potest aliquod ostensum non velle nisi quia in illo est aliqua ratio mali vel defectus alicuius boni. Sed in beatitudine ostensa in universali neutrum horum est. Igitur summe vult voluntas appetitu libero talem beatitudinem, quia in tali actione nunquam minus agit agens quam illum ultimum quod potest agere. In particulari tamen potest non appetere, quia potest appetere contrarium.

18 Contra: ista repugnant, quia beatitudo in particulari et ut in se nullam rationem habet mali nec defectum boni. Si propter hoc non possit voluntas eam non velle in universali, nec etiam in particulari.

19 Item, impossibile est quod beatitudo in universali aliquid perfectionis includat quod non beatitudo in particulari. Igitur si propter summam perfectionem non possit voluntas eam non velle in universali, multo magis nec in particulari.

20 Item, si illud velle liberum sit necessarium, hoc erit propter inclinationem naturalem quae necessaria est in beatitudine in universali. Sed voluntas appetitu naturali ex necessitate inclinatur ad beatitudinem in particulari, sic et appetitu libero consequente.

21 Item, quod necessitate appetam aliquid in universali, et intellectus rectus ostendit mihi quod non est nisi in a, impossibile est me non diligere a. Igitur cum ostenditur voluntati per intellectum non errante quod beatitudo vera non est nisi in particulari, necesse est quod velit eam in particulari sicut in universali.

22 Ideo dico quod loquendo de appetitu libero nec voluntas necessario vult beatitudinem in universali nec in particulari, quia necessitas causae superioris in actione sua non est ex causa inferiori, cum inferius non possit necessitare superius, sed e contra. Igitur si voluntas habet necessitatem in actione sua, hoc non erit per causam inferiorem. Sed quanta necessitate determinatur ad actionem suam ex se, tanta necessitate determinat causas inferiores ad actionem illam. Et sic si voluntas necessario habet velle beatitudinis, igitur ex necessitate determinat intellectum ad operationem suam, ut ad ostendendum sibi beatitudinem.

23 Ideo dico quod mere contingenter vult voluntas quodcumque sibi ostensum. Tamen ut in pluribus vult beatitudinem ostensam et cum magna difficultate posset non velle. Et ita non necessario vult quilibet beatitudinem in particulari appetitu libero, sed ut in pluribus. Non tamen eodem modo vult quilibet media ad beatitudinem appetitu libero, quia non quilibet vult bene agere. Unde ut in pluribus voluntas appetitu libero sequitur inclinationem naturalem, et credo quod difficilior esset appetitui libero eligere contrarium appetitui naturali quam contrarium alicuius ad quod inclinatur per quemcumque habitum acquisitum, quia nullus habitus acquisitus potest tantum inclinare voluntatem ad aliquid quantum inclinat appetitus naturalis. Ideo cum maxima difficultate appetitur appetitu libero contrarium eius quod appetitur appetitu naturali. Et illud velle liberum quod ut in pluribus sequitur appetitum naturalem non dicitur proprie appetitus naturalis, sed dicitur pro tanto naturale quia ut in

pluribus consequitur naturalem. Unde Augustinus in *Enchiridio*, aut voluntas non est, aut libera. Sicut tamen dicitur velle esse virtuosum non quia elicitur a virtute, sicut illud velle consequens potest dici naturale non quia elicitur naturaliter. Nec proprie dicitur illud velle deliberativum, sed liberum, quia deliberatio proprie est conclusionis syllogismi practici.

[B. DUBIA ET EORUM SOLUTIO]

24 Sed dubium occurrit, quia secundum Augustinum in *Enchirido* 73 et 76, sic volumus beatitudinem sicut nolumus miseriam. Sed de necessitate nolumus miseriam, igitur de necessitate simpliciter volumus beatitudinem.

25 Praeter hoc, non est nolle alicuius nisi propter velle alterius. Igitur sicut necessario nolumus unum, necessario volumus contrarium.

26 Dico quod neque necessario est nolle miseriam neque velle beatitudinem, sed tantum ut in pluribus. Tamen dico quod non possum velle miseriam, sed ex hoc non sequitur quod de necessitate volo beatitudinem, quia voluntas, licet non possit velle miseriam, tamen non necessario elicit contrarium respectu beatitudinis. Voluntas tamen potest elicere nolle respectu miseriae, nunquam tamen potest elicere velle respectu eius. Et sic ex alia parte voluntas potest elicere velle respectu beatitudinis, sed nunquam potest odire beatitudinem. Ex hoc non sequitur quod de necessitate vult beatitudinem, quia voluntas potest non elicere velle respectu beatitudinis et non elicere nolle respectu utriusque. Tamen nunquam potest elicere velle respectu miseriae nec nolle respectu beatitudinis, nec etiam amare miseriam nec odire beatitudinem.

27 Dicas: non est impossibilitas ad recipiendum unum contrariorum in susceptivo nisi quia necessario determinatur ad alterum, igitur non est impossibilitas in voluntate ad recipiendum nolle beatitudinis nisi quia determinatur ad velle.

28 Dico quod absolute non excluditur potentia a susceptivo ad recipiendum unum contrariorum nisi quia determinatur ad alterum. Tamen bene contingit respectu alicuius obiecti habere unum actum, si aliquis habeatur, et respectu illius nunquam potest haberi contrarius actus positive, tamen bene potest haberi negative non ille actus. Ut si video album, non potest ille actus esse congregativus respectu albi visus, quia ita determinatur potentia visiva respectu huius obiecti ad actum disgregandi visum quin possibile est habere actum contrarium respectu illius. Tamen respectu nigri bene potest, et potest non habere actum respectu albi, non actum disgregandi, quia potest non habere actum respectu illius. Sic dico quod circa obiectum beatificum non potest voluntas habere nolle, sed potest non habere velle; et respectu miseriae non potest habere velle, sed nolle et non nolle.

29 Et cum dicitur non privatur susceptivum aliquo nisi quia determinatur ad eius oppositum: verum est. Determinatur ad eius oppositum si aliquem actum debet habere positive circa illud, tamen negative potest non habere illum actum.

30 Ad rationes pro positione priori dico quod voluntas potest non velle obiectum licet in eo non sit aliqua ratio mali neque defectus boni, neque oportet quod voluntas habeat velle vel nolle de quolibet apprehenso, quia tunc simpliciter necessario peccarent mortaliter apprehenso aliquo quod tangit fidem si tenerentur positive elicere velle vel nolle. Ideo tunc possunt suspendere utrumque actum respectu talis obiecti quousque melius sint instructi, nec debent velle nec nolle interim. Similiter si occurrat phantasma alicuius agibilis cum quis studet, suspendit velle et nolle usque ad alias quousque investigaverit utrum debeat velle vel nolle. Hoc quilibet experitur in se. Non tamen hic suspenditur quilibet actus voluntatis, quia voluntas per actum reflexum suspendit velle et nolle respectu huius obiecti; tamen hoc est velle positive respectu voluntatis.

[II. AD ARGUMENTA PRINCIPALIA OCTAVAE QUAESTIONIS]

31 Ad primum principale dico quod illud concludit de actu elicitio, non de actu naturali.

32 Ad aliud: cum dicitur quod damnati non appetunt beatitudinem, dico quod loquendo de appetitu naturali, quod si manet natura humana in damnatis, manet iste appetitus respectu beatitudinis.

33 Et si dicas frustra est, dico quod non, quia non in tota specie. Sed ponentes angelos esse alterius speciei habent ponere mille appetitus naturales et nihil illius speciei potest assequi quod appetitur.

34 Loquendo de appetitu libero, dico quod si habent cognitionem de beatitudine, appetitus liber sequitur appetitum naturalem, et magis credo sequitur appetitus liber appetitum naturalem in his quam in iustis, quia immoderate volunt sibi bonum. Neque credo quod aliquis habitus spiritualis posset facere eos obstinatos sic quod appetitu libero elicerent contrarium.

35 Et cum dicitur ibi non est spes assequendi, dico quod appetitus duplex est, ut velle efficax et velleitas. Nunc autem appetitu efficaci non vult aliquis quod desperat habere, nec etiam quod sit sibi esse impossibile. Ideo non laborat ad hoc habendum. Tamen aliquis potest habere velleitatem ad illud quod sit impossibile habere, et potest esse actus intensior quam sit illud velle efficax respectu possibilis haberi, et in tali velleitate intensa potest esse meritum et peccatum mortale, quia velleitas potest esse actus ita mortalis sicut velle, licet non ita intense forte in genere peccati mortalis. Et sic dico quod damnati habent velleitatem respectu boni apprehensi, et hoc ut est bonum commodi, non autem affectione iusti. Et haec est maxima pars poenae eorum, quia si non haberent velleitatem respectu eius, carentia perpetua non esset poena, quia nulla poena mihi est carere illo respectu cuius nullam velleitatem habeo. Verumtamen non permittuntur considerare Deum in se, sicut posset naturae eorum competere, nec etiam permittuntur considerare se quantum ad naturam excellentem in qua foret secundaria quietatio.

36 Dico igitur quod in damnatis manet appetitus naturalis respectu beatitudinis et actus

elicitus velleitatis respectu eiusdem. Aliter enim non esset triste nisi appeterent per velleitatem de quo desperant assequi et quod ostenditur eis tamquam impossibile eis.

37 Ad aliud: dicitur quod in volitione beatitudinis in universali non est meritum, quia illam vult quis necessario. Dico tamen quod si ad rationem meriti requiritur contingentia in actu respectu causae, non est meritum volendo beatitudinem appetitu naturali, et difficile est cum hoc salvare meritum in appetitu libero si voluntas tantum sit passiva. Si tamen non necessario requiratur ad meritum contingentia in actu, videtur mihi quod actus circa finem est magis meritorius quam circa ea quae sunt ad finem, quia ille actus est bonus ex obiecto, ex natura actus et obiecti solum. Actus enim illorum quae sunt ad finem solum est bonus ex circumstantia.

38 Vel potest dici quod voluntas non necessario vult finem tamquam bonum honestum, immo potest velle ut bonum commodum. Ideo non est meritum in volendo finem qualitercumque, sed in volendo ut bonum honestum, hoc est, ut in se.

39 Ad aliud dico quod illud concludit de actu elicito, non autem de actu naturali.

40 Ad primum ad oppositum dico quod Augustinus intelligit de appetitu naturali. Sic enim omnes volunt esse beati. Vel si intelligatur de appetitu libero, dico quod verum est ut in pluribus.

41 Per idem ad aliud.

42 Ad aliud dictum est prius quomodo similitudo est inter finem in agibilibus et principium in speculabilibus, quia similitudo est ex parte obiectorum inter se, non autem quantum ad potentias.

43 Ad aliud dico quod Anselmus intelligit quod voluntas bonum non velle nequit, hoc est commoda nequit non velle affectione commodi si poneretur sine libertate. Sed iustitia moderatrix est, et ideo beati moderate appetunt bonum commodi.

44 Ad aliud, cum dicitur quod bonum omnia appetunt, igitur maximum bonum maxime, verum est appetitu naturali, etiam appetitu libero ut in pluribus.

[III. AD NONAM QUAESTIONEM]

45 Ad secundam quaestionem dico quod quodlibet quod appetitur appetitu naturali appetitur in ordine ad beatitudinem. Sed de appetitu elicito non oportet, quia potest aliquis velle aliquid appetitu contrario et appetitu negativo, quia aliquis potest velle in particulari aliquid quando nullo modo implicite nec explicite vult beatitudinem. Etiam possibile est apprehendere beatitudinem in particulari quomodo nobis est possibile et apprehendere fornicationem, et quod impossibile est fornicationem ordinari ad beatitudinem, immo ad contrarium, et stante hoc potest aliquis appetere fornicari, quia quilibet Christianus scit vel scire debet quod talis actus est impossibilis beatitudini, et quod quamdiu stat in appetitu impossibile est hominem ordinari ad beatitudinem, et tamen hoc non obstante fornicatio

appetitur.

[IV. AD ARGUMENTA PRINCIPALIA NONAE QUAESTIONIS]

46 Ad primum principale patet quod appetitu naturali appetuntur omnia in ordine ad beatitudinem, non autem appetitu libero.

47 Ad aliud dico quod primum in genere est causa aliorum secundum se, non autem sic quin aliud respiciatur a potentia.

48 Ad aliud, si quis vult fornicationem et non propter beatitudinem, igitur propter se: verum est. Vult propter se negative, hoc est, non propter aliud contrarium sibi. Hoc est, non vult illud qualitercumque, sed sic quod actu non refert ad aliud. Et sic in peccato veniali aliquis vult illum actum non propter beatitudinem, nec tamen propter se finaliter, tunc esset mortale. Ideo non excludit ordinabilitatem ad aliud.

49 Ad primum ad oppositum dico quod non semper intelligitur beatitudo, ideo non semper appetitur actu elicito.

50 Ad aliud, quod actus circa finem et illius qui est ad finem, si est unus, est comparativus sicut actus discursivus et collativus multorum, quia plura obiecta possunt esse unius actus collativi et discursivi. Unde si non possint simpliciter esse plures actus in voluntate nec in intellectu, dico quod non est alius actus quo volo finem et ea quae sunt ad finem, nec est unus proprie, sed comparativus illorum ad invicem. Si tamen concedatur quod cum actu comparativo vel collativo stant actus priores in se, tunc potest concedi quod simul voluntas habet actum comparativum illorum quae sunt ad finem respectu finis et finis secundum se et illius quod est ad finem secundum se, sicut cum visione comparativa qua visus comparat album ad nigrum stat videre albi in se et nigri secundum se, ita quod cum actu comparativo stat actus comparatorum secundum se sicut si non compararentur. Et sic potest duplex actus esse simul in voluntate.

Reportatio IV B, distinction 49, question 8, “Do all human beings will happiness necessarily and supremely?” and question 9, “Is everything that is desired, desired on account of happiness?”

QUESTION 8, “DO ALL HUMAN BEINGS WILL HAPPINESS NECESSARILY AND SUPREMEPLY?”

1 The eighth question is whether all human beings will happiness necessarily and supremely.

2 Arguments for the negative:

What is not known cannot be desired, according to Augustine, *De Trinitate* X.1. But not all human beings know happiness, as it evident from *Ethics* I.2.

3 Also, the damned do not desire happiness, both because they despair of attaining it—and according to Augustine, one does not desire what one has no hope of attaining (or at least one desires it only weakly)—and because happiness is presented to them as something impossible for them.

4 Also, if all human beings desired happiness necessarily, we would not obtain merit in desiring it, because what cannot be avoided is neither meritorious nor demeritorious. It is clear that the consequent is false, since we obtain merit in willing things that are for the end, and therefore we obtain merit in willing the end, since we obtain merit in willing things that are for the end only insofar as they are for the end. Now if x is for the sake of y , [and x is F ,] y is more F ; therefore, one obtains more merit by willing the end.

5 Also, it is not the case that all human beings desire happiness supremely, because an act in a supreme degree is not compatible with the act of another power or with another act of that power. But use is compatible with the volition by which we will happiness. Therefore, that act is not in the supreme degree.

6 Arguments for the affirmative:

Augustine, *De Trinitate* XIII.8: “All will to be happy, as all cry out.” Therefore, all will happiness necessarily. And that all will it supremely is evident in the same work, XIII.5, [where he says that all desire the end] with a most ardent love.

7 Also, *Physics* II and *Ethics* VII, “As a principle is in speculative matters, so is the end in matters of action.”

8 Also, Anselm, *De concordia* XX: “[The will] cannot not will [the advantageous good].” And in *Ethics* I the Philosopher approves those who say that happiness is what all things desire. Therefore, it is desired necessarily and supremely.

QUESTION 9, "IS EVERYTHING THAT IS DESIRED, DESIRED ON ACCOUNT OF HAPPINESS?"

9 The ninth question is whether everything that is desired is desired on account of happiness.

10 Arguments for the affirmative:

Augustine, *De Trinitate* XIII.5: "on account of this they desire all things," etc.

11 Also, what is first in any genus is the cause of all other things [in that genus]. Happiness is first in the genus of desirable things.

12 Also, if something is desired, and *not* on account of happiness, then it is desired for its own sake, and consequently it is desired *as* happiness. So if something other than happiness is not desired on account of happiness, it is desired on account of happiness.

13 Arguments for the negative:

Not everyone understands happiness. Therefore, it is not the case that everyone who desires something, desires it on account of happiness.

14 Also, if so, then there would be two acts in the will simultaneously. For if something is desired on account of happiness, it follows that happiness is desired at that time, and thus there is one act in the will; and something else is desired, and thus there is another act in the will.

I. REPLY TO QUESTION 8

A. NATURAL APPETITE AND FREE APPETITE

15 In reply to the first question I say that there is a twofold appetite in the intellective part: natural appetite and free appetite. For every nature has in one way a natural appetite, so the will has both a natural appetite and free willing. The first appetite of the will is not an act elicited by the will, since just as natural apprehension of the intellect is not an act elicited by the intellect, neither is [the natural appetite] of the will. For if it were, then given that the natural appetite is always present if the nature is intact, there would be a second act existing in the will at all times. And in that case there would sometimes be opposite desires in the will at the same time, as Paul by his natural appetite willed not to be unclothed and by an elicited appetite willed to be with Christ. Hence, the natural inclination to a thing's own perfection is never an elicited act, and it does not differ as an absolute thing from the nature. This is the sense in which, according to *Physics* I, matter desires form and, universally, what is imperfect desires its own perfection.

16 Speaking in terms of this appetite of the will, I say that it wills happiness necessarily, supremely, and at all times, because the nature can't be perfect without happiness. And it does

not will happiness only universally, but it supremely wills happiness in particular, since given that it naturally wills its own perfection, it follows that it supremely wills its supreme perfection, and happiness in itself and in particular is its supreme perfection. For if it is not within a thing's power to act or not act, but rather it acts necessarily, then it is not within its power to act [intensely or] not intensely. Therefore, a natural agent always acts to the full extent of its power. And it is evident that it necessarily wills happiness in particular because happiness universally is not sufficient for the perfection of the will, but rather the real and intrinsic happiness by which it is joined immediately to the ultimate end, and this obtains in real, particular happiness. Hence, in order happiness to be desired in this way, it need not be known and there need not be any elicited act of desiring.

17 If the question is about free appetite, one view is that even here the will necessarily wills happiness, at least universally, although it could fail to will happiness supremely in particular. For the will can refrain from willing something presented to it only if there is some aspect of evil or a deficiency of some good in that thing, and in happiness presented universally there is neither of these. Therefore, the will supremely wills such happiness, because in such an action an agent never acts to a lesser extent than the fullest of which it is capable. But the will can fail to will happiness in particular, because it can desire something contrary.

18 On the contrary: these claims are contradictory, since happiness in particular and in itself has no aspect of evil or deficiency of goodness; so if for that reason the will cannot fail to will happiness universally, then it also cannot fail to will happiness in particular.

19 Also, it is impossible for happiness universally to include some perfection that happiness in particular does not. So if for this reason the will cannot fail to will happiness universally, it also cannot fail to will happiness in particular.

20 Also, if that free willing is necessary, this will be because of [the will's] natural inclination, which is necessary with respect to happiness universally. But the will is necessarily inclined by its natural appetite to happiness in particular, and so it will also [be necessarily inclined] by the free appetite consequent [upon its natural appetite].

21 Also, if I necessarily desire something universally, and a correct intellect shows me that thing does not exist except in *a*, then it is impossible for me not to love *a*. So when an intellect that is not in error shows the will that true happiness does not exist except in particular, the will necessarily wills happiness in particular just as it wills happiness universally.

22 Therefore, speaking of free appetite, I say that the will does not necessarily will happiness either universally or in particular, because necessity in a superior cause cannot derive from necessity in an inferior cause, because necessity in the action of a superior cause does not derive from an inferior cause, since what is inferior cannot necessitate what is superior, but only vice versa. Therefore, if the will has necessity in its action, such necessity will not derive from an inferior cause. Rather, by however great a necessity the will is of itself determined to its action, it will determine inferior causes to their action by as great a necessity. And thus if the

will necessarily wills happiness, it necessarily determines the intellect to its activity, that is, to presenting happiness to the will. cannot determine the mode of acting of a superior cause, just as it cannot determine a superior cause to act. So if a superior cause acts necessarily, it has this necessity from its own intrinsic being and from its own nature. So if the will necessarily wills something, this necessity characterizes the will in virtue of its own nature (*ratio*) and not in virtue of some inferior cause.

23 I therefore say that the will merely contingently wills whatever is presented to it. Nonetheless, it does for the most part will happiness when happiness is presented to it, and it could fail to will happiness only with great difficulty. And thus it is not the case that everyone necessarily wills happiness in particular by his free appetite, but only for the most part. But not everyone wills the means to happiness by his free appetite in the same way, because not everyone wills to act rightly. Hence, the will for the most part follows its natural inclination by its free appetite, and I believe that it would be more difficult for the free appetite to choose something contrary to the natural appetite than something contrary to that to which it is inclined by any acquired habit, since no acquired habit can inclined the will to something as much as the natural appetite does. And that free willing that for the most part follows the natural appetite is not properly called natural appetite, but is called natural in a certain respect, because it follows the natural appetite for the most part. This is why Augustine says in the *Enchiridion* that either it is not a will or it is free.¹³ Nonetheless, just as a willing is called virtuous but not because it is elicited by a virtue, a willing consequent [upon natural appetite] can be called natural but not because it is elicited naturally. Nor is that willing properly called deliberative, but free, because deliberation properly speaking has to do with the conclusion of a practical syllogism.

B. POINTS OF CONTROVERSY

24 But here a point of controversy arises. For according to Augustine in *Enchiridion* 73 and 76, we will happiness in the same way that we will-against unhappiness. Now we will-against unhappiness necessarily, so we will happiness unqualifiedly necessarily.

25 Furthermore, one wills-against one thing only because one wills some other thing. Therefore, just as we necessarily will-against one thing, we necessarily will its contrary.

26 I say that we neither will-against unhappiness nor will happiness necessarily, but only for the most part. Nonetheless, I say that I cannot will unhappiness, but from that it does not follows that I necessarily will happiness, for although the will cannot will unhappiness, it does not necessarily elicit the contrary act with respect to happiness. But the will can elicit willing-against with respect to unhappiness, and yet it can never elicit willing with respect to

¹³ See the parallel passage in *Reportatio* IV A for the quotation, which is completely garbled here.

unhappiness. And on the other hand, the will can elicit willing with respect to happiness, but it can never hate happiness. From this it does not follow that it necessarily wills happiness, since the will can fail to elicit willing with respect to happiness and fail to elicit willing-against with respect to both. But it can never elicit willing with respect to unhappiness or willing-against with respect to happiness, and it also cannot love unhappiness or hate unhappiness.

27 You might say: the only reason that it is impossible for a given subject to receive one of a pair of contraries is that it is determined necessarily to the other. Therefore, the only reason it is impossible for the will to receive willing-against with respect to happiness is that it is [necessarily] determined to willing happiness.

38 I say that only reason that the possibility of a subject's receiving one of a pair of contraries is excluded absolutely is that the subject is determined to the other. Nonetheless, it can certainly be the case that a subject can have only one act with respect to a given object, if it has any act at all, and yet it can fail to have that act [with respect to that object]. For example, if I see white, that act of seeing white cannot be an act produced by constriction of the medium, because the visual power is determined with respect to that object to an act produced by dilation, in such a way that it is not possible for it to have the contrary act with respect to that object. But it can perfectly well have the contrary act with respect to black, and it can fail to have an act with respect to white—an act produced by dilation—because it can fail to have that act with respect to that object. In the same way, I say that the will cannot have an act of willing-against concerning the beatific object, but it can fail to have an act of willing; and it cannot have an act of willing with respect to unhappiness, but it can have, and it can fail to have, an act of willing-against.

29 As for the claim that a subject is deprived of one thing only because it is determined to the opposite: that's true. It is determined to its opposite *if* it is appropriate for it to have any positive act at all concerning that object; but it can fail to have that act.

30 To the arguments given for the previous view, I say that the will can fail to will an object in which there is no aspect of evil or deficiency of goodness, and that the will does not have to have an act of either willing or willing-against concerning every apprehended object. For if it did, once people apprehended something that touches on the faith, if they were bound to elicit a positive act of willing or of willing-against, they would necessarily sin mortally. So in fact they can suspend both acts with respect to such an object until they are better instructed, and in the meantime they should neither will nor will-against. Similarly, if, when someone is intent on other affairs, a phantasm of some possible action should occur to him, he suspends willing and willing-against it until another time, when he has looked into whether he ought to will it or will-against it. Now it's not that all acts of will are suspended in such a case, since the will by a reflexive act suspends willing and willing-against with respect to that object, and that is a positive act on the part of the will.

II. REPLIES TO THE PRELIMINARY ARGUMENTS OF Q. 8

31 To the first preliminary argument, I say that the argument establishes its conclusion with regard to an elicited act but not with regard to a natural act.

32 To the next argument: as for the claim that the damned do not desire happiness, I say that if we are speaking of natural appetite, the appetite for happiness remains in the damned if human nature remains in them.

33 Now you might say that in that case, the appetite is in vain. I say that it is not in vain, because [it does] not [fail to attain its object] in the whole species. But those who claim that all angels differ in species have to acknowledge a thousand natural appetites, and nothing of that species can attain what is desired.

34 If we are speaking of free appetite, I say that if they have cognition of happiness, free appetite follows natural appetite. And I believe that free appetite follows natural appetite more in them than in the just, since they will the good for themselves immoderately. And I do not believe that any spiritual habit can so fix them on evil that they would elicit a contrary act by free appetite.

35 As for the claim that in the damned there is no hope of attaining happiness, I say that there is a twofold appetite: efficacious willing and velleity. Now no one wills with an efficacious desire what he despairs of having or what is impossible for him. Therefore, he puts forth no effort toward having it. But someone can have a velleity for something that is impossible for him to have, and that act can be more intense than an efficacious willing of something that it is possible for him to have. And there can be merit and mortal sin in such an intense velleity, because a velleity can be a mortal sin just as [an act of efficacious] willing can, although perhaps not as intense a sin within a particular genus of mortal sin. And thus I say that the damned have a velleity with respect to the good they apprehend, which they apprehend as an advantageous good, but [they do] not [have this velleity] through the affection for justice. And this is the greatest part of their punishment, because if they did not have a velleity with respect to this, their everlasting lack of that good would not be a punishment for them: for it is no punishment for me to lack something with respect to which I have no velleity. But they are not permitted to consider God in himself (as their nature would be capable of doing), nor are they permitted themselves as an excellent nature that could enjoy rest in God.

36 So I say that the natural appetite for happiness, and an elicited act of velleity for happiness, remains in the damned. Otherwise, if they did not desire (through a velleity) what they despair of attaining and what is presented to them as impossible for them, their lacking it would not be a matter of sorrow for them.

37 To the next argument I say that there is no merit in the volition of happiness universally, since one wills that necessarily. But I say that if contingency in an act with respect to its cause is required for merit, there is no merit in willing happiness by natural appetite, and it is difficult to

see how this is compatible with merit in free appetite if the will is purely passive. If, however, contingency in an act is not necessarily required for merit, it seems to me that that an act concerning the end is more meritorious than an act concerning things that are for the end, since the former act is good in virtue of its object, by the nature of the act and the object alone. For an act concerning things that are for the end is merely circumstantially good.

38 An alternative response is that the will does not necessarily will the end as an intrinsically worthy good. So there is not merit in willing the end in just any old way, but only in willing the end as an intrinsically worthy good, that is, for its own sake.

39 To the next argument I say that this argument establishes the conclusion with regard to an elicited act but not with regard to a natural act.

40 As for the first argument for the affirmative, I say that Augustine is talking about natural appetite, for it is by the natural appetite that all will to be happy. Or we understand this as applying to free appetite, I say that it is true for the most part.

41 The same reply works for the next argument as well.

42 As for the next argument, I explained earlier how there is an analogy between the end in matters of action and a principle in speculative matters: the analogy is on the part of the *objects*, not the *powers*.

43 To the next argument, I say that what Anselm means by the claim that the will cannot not will what is good is that if there were a will without freedom, it could not fail to will advantages by the affection for advantage. But justice moderates [the affection for advantage], and so the blessed desire the advantageous good in a moderate way.

III. REPLY TO QUESTION 9

45 To the second question I say that everything that is desired by natural appetite is desired as directed toward happiness. But this need not be the case for elicited appetite, since someone can will something by a contrary appetite and by a negative appetite. For someone can will some particular thing when he is not willing happiness either implicitly or explicitly. It is also possible to apprehend happiness in particular (to the extent that that is possible for us) and to apprehend fornication and the fact that it is impossible for fornication to be directed toward happiness—rather, it is directed to the contrary—and yet despite all that someone can desire to fornicate. For every Christian knows, or ought to know, that such an act is incompatible with happiness, and that as long as it remains in one's desire, it is impossible for a human being to be directed toward happiness; and yet notwithstanding this, fornication is desired.

IV. REPLIES TO THE PRELIMINARY ARGUMENTS OF Q. 9

46 In reply to the first preliminary argument, it is clear that by natural desire all things are

desired as directed toward happiness, but not by free desire.

47 To the next argument I say that what is first in a genus is the cause of other things [in that genus] in its own right, but not in such a way that a power cannot have something else as its object.

48 To the next argument, which says that if someone wills fornication and does not will it for the sake of happiness, he therefore wills it for its own sake: that is true. He wills it for its own sake *negatively*, that is, not for the sake of something else contrary to it. In other words, he does not will it in just any old way, but in such a way that he does not actually refer it to anything else. And thus in venial sin someone wills an act, not for the sake of happiness, but also not for its own sake as an end in its own right—for that would be a mortal sin. Therefore, this does not exclude the possibility of its being directed toward something else.

49 To the first argument for the negative I say that happiness is not always understood; therefore, it is not always desired in an elicited act.

50 To the next argument I say that if an concerning an end and an act concerning what is for the end are one act, it is a comparative act, just like an act that is discursive and relates many things, since there can be many objects for a single discursive act that relates many things. Hence, if there cannot be unqualifiedly many acts in the will or in the intellect, I say that there are not distinct acts by which I will the end and things that are for the end, but there is also not one act, properly speaking. Rather, there is an act that relates them to each other. If, on the other hand, one concedes that the prior acts remain present with the comparative or relating act, then one can concede that the will simultaneous has the act that relates things that are for the end to the end, the act concerning the end as such, and the act concerning what is for the end as such—just as the comparative act of vision in which vision compares white with black coexists with the act of seeing white as such and the act of seeing black as such. Thus the acts concerned the things that are compared coexist with the comparative act, just as if those things were not being compared. And in this way there can be a twofold act in the will at a given time.